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PROJECT OVERVIEW AND DESIGN 
Severe storms such as Hurricane Harvey that battered the Texas Gulf Coast in August 2017 not 
only stretch resources related to short-term rescue, safety and health, but also generate extensive 
discussion and planning to manage the long-term recovery as well as to improve the resilience of 
Texas Coastal communities.  Any future planning, policies, and resource allocation strategies will 
reflect key local and state stakeholders’ views regarding risk, cost, capacity, and policy options 
(see, for example, Alexander, 2000; Adger et al. 2005; Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010; 
Portney, 2015; and Wenger, 2017).  The project team designed and deployed a targeted in-depth 
survey of key stakeholders in the Texas Coastal Bend Region to identify their views on problem 
sources, risk perceptions, planning goals, policy evaluations, resource allocations, and patterns of 
interaction across groups related to recent environmental stressors like Harvey. The findings from 
this survey are reported below. 
 
Survey of Stakeholder Organizations 
The team sought to identify the universe of relevant organizations working on issues of recovery 
and resilience in this Coastal Bend Region of Texas. Organizations appropriate for this study 
include local, regional, state and national governmental units, university extension personnel, and 
more locally centered business and industry, healthcare providers, advocacy groups, and nonprofit 
organizations within Aransas, Bee, Brooks, Duval, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg, Live Oak, 
Nueces, Refugio, and San Patricio.  Each of these stakeholder groups plays an important role in 
creating support for policies and actions that can strengthen community resilience. 
 
Stakeholder organizations within each of the groups listed below were identified through several 
approaches. First, the Texas OneGulf project team and personnel from Texas Sea Grant Extension 
shared contact information for relevant organizations and distributed a recruitment flyer through 
their outreach channels. Second, the research team used various online resources to identify 
relevant organizations and collect contact information for the appropriate individuals.  
 
The government stakeholder group includes individuals working in federal, state, regional, 
county, city, and town governments as well as individuals working in independent school 
districts, colleges, and universities. This category also includes transit-related authorities, such as 
the publicly owned regional transit authorities, airports, and seaports; resource-related 
authorities, such as river authorities, water districts, and soil and water conservation districts; and 
social service related authorities such as housing authorities. Specific organizations were 
included in this group based upon a mixture of three factors: available contact information, 
location within or knowledge of the Coastal Bend Region, and knowledge of Hurricane Harvey 
operations.  
 
The business and business advocacy stakeholder group comprises individuals from local 
businesses in the Coastal Bend, the chambers of commerce staff within the area, and statewide or 
regional business advocacy groups. Specific local businesses and chambers of commerce were 
included based on available contact information and location within the Coastal Bend Region. 
Specific advocacy organizations were included based on regional location and their 
representation of local industries important to resilience efforts.  
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The environment and environmental advocacy stakeholder group consists of individuals from 
environmental groups participating in conservation, sustainability, or resilience efforts and those 
advocating for an environment-related cause. They include nature conservancies, environmental 
foundations, environmental partnerships, environmental trusts, environmental associations, 
nonprofits working towards sustainability, and nonprofits working towards environmental 
justice. Specific local environmental organizations were included based on available contact 
information and location within the Coastal Bend Region. Advocacy groups were included based 
on regional location and their representation of subjects related to resiliency.  
 
The service nonprofit stakeholder group includes individuals from organizations that either 
support vulnerable populations or provide public assistance during disaster response. These 
organizations advocate for vulnerable populations or provide direct support to low-income 
populations, such as shelters, food banks, charities, and emergency aid. Specific service 
nonprofit stakeholders were included based on available contact information and location within 
the Coastal Bend Region.  
 
The healthcare stakeholder group comprises individuals from hospitals, medical centers, mental 
health clinics, community health centers, assisted living facilities, nursing homes, and regional 
medical groups. Specific organizations were included based upon a mixture of available contact 
information and of location within or knowledge of the Coastal Bend Region.  
 
The Stakeholder Survey was conducted by the Public Policy Research Institute (PPRI) at Texas 
A&M University from January 21 to March 10, 2020. PPRI conducted the survey online using 
Qualtrics, a state-of-the-art survey research platform that tracks data collection and provides real-
time updates regarding survey completes. Starting on January 21st, a total of 1,751 potential 
participants with unique emails were sent a recruitment email customized to their organization 
type via Qualtrics. Of these emails, 13 failed and 150 bounced back, indicating bad addresses. For 
these bad email addresses, PPRI looked online for alternative contact information and emailed and 
calling those organizations for a contact when one was not found online.  This was done to provide 
every opportunity for organizations to respond to the survey. For the remaining initial emails, up 
to three reminder emails were sent via Qualtrics for individuals who had not yet started or finished 
the survey. The reminder emails were sent at different times of the day and generally sent 3 or 4 
days apart.  
 
PPRI attempted to reach all non-responsive individuals via telephone calls starting on February 
12th and ending on March 3rd. Non-respondents included bounced and failed emails as well as 
those who did not click on the survey after the 3 reminder emails were sent. A total of 460 potential 
participants were reached by these calls. During these calls, PPRI shared the importance of the 
survey, confirmed email addresses, offered to resend the survey, and suggested that the respondent 
check any spam filter. The callers also asked the respondent to recommend additional potential 
respondents in their field.  If the respondent stated that a different individual would be a more 
relevant survey contact at their organization, the new potential participant’s contact name, email, 
and phone number was requested by the caller. The 249 new potential participants discovered 
during these phone calls were sent an email invitation via Qualtrics. Of these emails, three failed 
and 15 bounced back. Non-respondents received up to three reminder emails as needed.  
 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy  The Bush School  Texas A&M University 6 
 
To encourage submission of completed surveys, all participants who had partially completed the 
survey were sent two additional emails to remind them to complete the questionnaire. As an 
additional method of increasing participation and avoiding spam filters, PPRI sent emails outside 
of the Qualtrics platform.  For this approach, potential participants were sent a personal link to the 
survey, generated by Qualtrics, through a third party mail system. This process was used to try to 
circumvent spam filters while still tracking survey completions through Qualtrics. The Qualtrics 
emails that went unanswered were delivered online using Maestro on March 4th with no major 
difference in completions, clicks, or bounces compared to Qualtrics. Some of the new contact 
emails obtained from telephone calls were also released in Lime Survey and Outlook. Again, 
compared to Qualtrics, there were no major differences in completions, clicks, or bounced emails. 
Of the new emails sent with personal survey links through these third party mail systems, 56 
bounced in these third party mail systems and 15 bounced and 3 failed in Qualtrics.  
 
A combined total of 2,000 potential participants were sent recruitment emails about the survey 
(1,751 initial unique emails plus 249 additional unique emails).  When the survey closed on March 
10th, 448 of those who had received an invitation to the survey had opened the survey link. 
Participants who did not complete any portion of the survey or click through the entire study were 
removed from the final survey data set, as were participants who did not complete a majority of 
the survey information. Participants who did not provide organizational information were also not 
retained in the survey data set. This left 217 participants included in the final survey data set. The 
completion rate was 10.85% with a median completion time of 15.1 minutes time. 
 
Participants in this study worked for a variety of organizations (Figure 1). The majority of 
participants worked for nonprofits/non-governmental organizations (32.7 percent) and 
government organizations (29.5 percent). On average, participants had been with their current 
organization for 9.8 years (SD = 8.68). 
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Respondents also held various, and often multiple, roles within their organization (see Figure 2). By far the 
most common role performed was that of executive management. However, many respondents also worked 
in public engagement, planning, project management, and education.  
 
 
 
 
Perceived Unit Competence 
Stakeholder respondents were asked to indicate how competent or incompetent they found the various 
organizational entities that were working to provide help for their communities when faced with natural 
disasters like Harvey.  The full list of responses and the scale used are included in Figure 3.  We summarize 
here the major stakeholder observations.    
 
Overall, participants indicated that most organizations fell somewhere in the range of Neutral to Competent. 
Participants indicated that they found community religious organizations (such as churches, mosques, or 
synagogues), nonprofits, and the Texas Division of Emergency Management to be the most competent at 
helping their communities recover from natural disasters, with average ratings falling between Competent 
and Very Competent. Other state agencies such as the Governor’s Office, the Texas General Land Office 
and the Texas Legislature also received relatively good ratings.  The U.S. Corps of Engineers, FEMA and 
U.S. EPA also received generally good marks, if slightly lower than state offices.  Participants rated 
insurance companies lowest, but still as at least Neutral at helping local communities recover. No group 
received an overall negative rating. 
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Impact of Hurricane Harvey on Flooding, Damage, and Recovery 
Participants were asked to examine a list of potential causes of flooding and to list how much impact they 
believe each cause had on the amount of flooding that occurred in the Coastal Bend area as a result of 
Hurricane Harvey. Of the potential causes of flooding listed, over 65 percent of participants believed that 
inadequate drainage of flood prone areas had a Strong or Very Strong impact, nearly 60 percent believed 
that building in areas prone to flooding had a Strong or Very Strong impact, and almost 51 percent believed 
that degraded natural flood control areas (e.g., wetlands, coastal barrier islands, sand dunes) had a Strong 
or Very Strong impact on flooding in the Coastal Bend area. A substantial number of respondents also 
believed that inadequate flood protection infrastructure had a Strong or Very Strong impact on Harvey 
flooding. See Table 1 below for the full list of potential causes and respondents’ ratings of their impacts. 
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Table 1 
Impact of Various Causes of Flooding in the Coastal Bend Area due to Hurricane Harvey 
 
 
  
Potential Causes of 
Flooding from Hurricane 
Harvey 
No 
Impact 
Weak 
Impact 
Somewhat 
Strong 
Impact 
Strong 
Impact 
Very 
Strong 
Impact 
Not Sure 
 (Percentage) 
Building in areas prone to 
flooding 
3.24 11.57 17.13 24.54 35.19 8.33 
Degraded natural flood 
protection areas such as 
wetlands, open space, 
coastal barrier islands, and 
sand dunes 
 
4.61 15.67 15.21 24.42 26.27 13.82 
Inadequate drainage of 
flood prone areas 
 
3.24 7.87 13.89 35.65 30.09 9.26 
Development that covers 
too much land in 
nonabsorbent materials 
such as concrete and 
asphalt 
 
4.17 22.69 12.50 19.44 25.46 15.74 
Inadequate flood protection 
infrastructures such as 
dams, levees, storm water 
systems, retention ponds, 
and sea walls 
 
5.56 24.07 18.52 21.30 18.06 12.50 
Ineffective 
intergovernmental flood 
planning and cooperation 
 
4.63 22.22 17.59 19.44 19.91 16.20 
Funding shortage to build 
appropriate flood 
protection infrastructures 
 
3.24 15.74 17.59 20.83 25.46 17.13 
Local hazard mitigation 
plan does not require 
implementation of the 
actions it identifies as ways 
to improve flood 
protections. 
4.65 16.74 19.53 13.02 14.88 31.16 
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Impact in the Coastal Bend Community 
To assess both perceived damage and subsequent recovery, participants were asked two questions: 1) 
“How much damage did Hurricane Harvey cause to the following buildings, infrastructure, and resources 
in your community?” and 2) “How much have the following buildings, infrastructure, and resources in 
your community recovered since Hurricane Harvey?” Participants rated damage on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging 
from No Damage to Significant Damage. Likewise, participants rated recovery on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging 
from Not Recovered to Recovered. Responses are reported in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4, participants indicated that single and multi-family housing units sustained the most 
damage out of all of the listed buildings, infrastructure, and resources, and were considered to be the least 
recovered. Energy infrastructure, while identified has having incurred between some damage to a lot of 
damage, was considered to have recovered the most, followed closely by communication systems, water 
supply infrastructure, and wastewater infrastructure. 
 
Participants were also asked to indicate which, if any, segments of their communities were especially hard 
hit by Hurricane Harvey. Of the community segments listed in Figure 5, 158 participants indicated that 
low-income residents in their community were especially hard hit. About the same number of participants 
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indicated renters (136), the elderly (133), and homeowners (131) were especially hard hit.  Children were 
selected by the least number of participants (101). 
 
 
Market Sector Recovery 
In addition to other areas of recovery, participants were asked about their perceptions of the recovery of 
various market sectors in their communities. Overall, participants believed that the large-scale 
commercial enterprise sector was the most recovered. Almost 69 percent of respondents indicated that 
they found that sector to be Mostly Recovered or Recovered. There was less certainty about small 
businesses and the rental housing market. While 44.1 percent of respondents believed that small 
businesses were Mostly Recovered or Recovered, another 27.7 percent indicated that the small business 
sector was only Somewhat Recovered. Similarly, 44 percent believed that the rental housing market 
Mostly Recovered or Recovered, while 21.8 percent indicated that it was Somewhat Recovered, and 14.6 
percent believed it was Not Recovered or only A Little Recovered. Table 1 lists the full set of responses 
and the scale. 
 
Table 2 
Perceptions of Market Sector Recovery after Hurricane Harvey 
Market 
Sectors 
Not 
Recovered 
A Little 
Recovered 
Somewhat 
Recovered 
Mostly 
Recovered 
Recovered 
Not 
Sure 
 (Percentage) 
Rental housing 
market 
4.15 10.36 21.76 22.80 21.24 19.69 
Real estate 
market 
2.58 3.61 15.98 29.90 27.84 20.10 
Recreational 
fishing 
0.54 3.23 10.22 26.88 33.87 25.27 
Tourism (other 
than fishing) 
0.53 3.74 20.32 29.41 25.13 20.86 
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Figure 5: Perceptions of Which Community Segments were 
Especially Hard Hit by Hurricane Harvey
Count
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Small 
businesses 
2.05 8.21 27.69 26.67 17.44 17.95 
Large-scale 
commercial 
enterprises 
0.00 1.57 8.38 28.80 39.27 21.99 
Healthcare 
services 
7.49 5.88 8.02 14.44 42.25 21.93 
Job market 2.08 6.25 17.19 17.19 36.98 20.31 
 
 
Organizational Collaboration and Activities 
Next, organizational representatives were asked to list organizations with whom they have collaborated on 
recovery and resilience issues since Hurricane Harvey. Along with the name of the organizations with 
whom they have collaborated, participants were asked to identify the frequency of the collaboration (either 
weekly, monthly or annually) as well as the importance of the collaboration for improving resiliency.  
 
Participants identified approximately 362 organizations with whom they have collaborated since Hurricane 
Harvey. The top five most collaborated with organizations are FEMA (52 collaborations), the Texas 
General Land Office (39 collaborations), various county governments (17 collaborations), Red Cross (14 
collaborations), and the Texas Division of Emergency Management (14 collaborations).  
 
These organizations were coded into seven categories: Business, Government, Education, Environmental, 
Nonprofit, Healthcare, and Other. The frequency of these collaborations is depicted in Figure 6. By far, 
organizations collaborate most often with government organizations. These include local, state, and federal 
government entities. The second most collaborated with groups include nonprofit organizations. These 
entities include national groups like the American Red Cross as well as several nonprofit organizations 
local to both Texas and the Coastal Bend Region.  
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In terms of recovery and resiliency activities, organizational representatives were asked to indicate whether 
or not they had engaged in specific activities, either individually or with other organizations. The most 
engaged-in activity was increasing the sharing of information. For this activity, 61 organizations worked to 
increase information sharing individually, while 103 organizations worked on this task with other 
organizations. Infrastructure repair and construction-related activities were also popular, and included the 
funding, planning, and making of infrastructure repairs and construction. See Figure 7, below, for additional 
detail. 
 
 
 
 
Support for Policy Actions 
Respondents were asked to indicate how much they oppose or support the following policy actions meant 
to improve recovery and resiliency to hurricanes and strong storms in the Coastal Bend area. Support was 
rated on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 indicated that the participant Strongly Opposed the policy action and 5 
indicated that they Strongly Supported the action. The top three most supported actions were safeguarding 
natural flood protection areas, strengthening infrastructure design standards, and strengthening building 
design standards (see Figure 8). Other supported policy actions clustered around limiting rebuilding and 
development in flood prone areas. The least supported policy action was charging impact fees for 
development in flood prone areas. In fact, there was a significant difference in support by race, such that 
racial minority participants were less likely than white participants to support charging impact fees. 
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Finally, participants were asked to assess how ineffective or effective they believe certain government 
actions would be for improving community resilience. As Table 3 indicates, over two-thirds of all 
participants indicated that all policies listed would be either Effective or Very Effective government 
actions. Specifically, over 85 percent of participants indicated a belief that forming partnership 
agreements for recovery work would be an effective government action, and over 84 percent believed that 
prioritizing functions most critical to recovery would an effective government action. 
 
Table 3 
Perceived Efficacy of Government Actions on Improving Community Resilience 
Government Actions 
Very 
Ineffective 
Ineffective Neutral Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Not Sure 
 (Percentage) 
Establish coordination 
agreements between 
municipalities to provide mutual 
aid 
 
0.49 3.45 9.85 48.28 25.12 12.81 
Establish coordination 
agreements for using municipal 
and state resources 
 
0.49 1.48 9.85 49.26 29.56 9.36 
Prioritize functions most critical 
to recovery 
 
0.49 0.49 7.39 42.86 41.38 7.39 
Form partnership agreements 
for recovery work such as debris 
removal and road repairs 
 
0.00 0.99 5.91 45.32 39.90 7.88 
Streamline application 
processes for social services and 
disaster programs 
 
0.99 1.97 7.39 31.53 48.28 9.85 
Create a regional task force to 
prioritize and oversee the 
recovery process 
 
0.99 5.42 14.29 33.99 33.99 11.33 
Identify regulatory waivers 
needed during a disaster 
0.99 3.96 14.85 29.70 36.63 13.86 
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